Funder
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Computer Science Applications,General Economics, Econometrics and Finance,General Social Sciences,Applied Psychology,Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous),Developmental and Educational Psychology,General Decision Sciences
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