Against Neuropsychoanalysis: Why a Dialogue With Neuroscience Is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Psychoanalysis

Abstract

The author argues against neuropsychoanalysis by focusing on the metaphysical issues. Neuropsychoanalysts argue that the philosophical theories of dual aspect monism (DAM) and anomalous monism support their position. The author contends that not only do DAM and anomalous monism not offer support for neuropsychoanalysis; they are also inconsistent with its claims. The conceptual distinction between the mental and the physical — the so-called “epistemological dualism” cited by neuropsychoanalysis—stands as an insurmountable barrier to the project of neuropsychoanalysis. By way of example, the author offers an analogy with artworks. The author concludes the paper by arguing that neuropsychoanalysis deflects from the real project of psychoanalysis, which is the study of persons, not so-called “mindbrains.”