Abstract
In the discussion of personal identity, from his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume reaches a famous, if notorious conclusion: there is no self. We are “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions” (T 252). My argument is that Hume's thesis on the self rests on a questionable rejection of a rival view that appears to commit the fallacy of equivocation. Along the way I identify a few possible problems with Hume's overall analysis of the self. My argument is that these diffi culties center around the conceptual apparatus Hume relies on to explain and analyze consciousness.
Publisher
Edinburgh University Press
Subject
Philosophy,History,Cultural Studies
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