The Case for Heterogeneity in Metacognitive Appraisals of Biased Beliefs

Abstract

Academic Abstract Prominent theories of belief and metacognition make different predictions about how people evaluate their biased beliefs. These predictions reflect different assumptions about (a) people’s conscious belief regulation goals and (b) the mechanisms and constraints underlying belief change. I argue that people exhibit heterogeneity in how they evaluate their biased beliefs. Sometimes people are blind to their biases, sometimes people acknowledge and condone them, and sometimes people resent them. The observation that people adopt a variety of “metacognitive positions” toward their beliefs provides insight into people’s belief regulation goals as well as insight into way that belief formation is free and constrained. The way that people relate to their beliefs illuminates why they hold those beliefs. Identifying how someone thinks about their belief is useful for changing their mind. Public Abstract The same belief can be alternatively thought of as rational, careful, unfortunate, or an act of faith. These beliefs about one’s beliefs are called “metacognitive positions.” I review evidence that people hold at least four different metacognitive positions. For each position, I discuss what kinds of cognitive processes generated belief and what role people’s values and preferences played in belief formation. We can learn a lot about someone’s belief based on how they relate to that belief. Learning how someone relates to their belief is useful for identifying the best ways to try to change their mind.