Distributed state estimation–based secondary control of island microgrid under false data injection attacks

Abstract

This paper develops a distributed secondary control strategy for direct current (DC) microgrid based on the distributed state estimation under false data injection (FDI) attacks. FDI attacks occurring on sensors, communication links, and control channels are fully considered, and a distributed state estimation–based secondary control is designed to filter out the effects of attack signals introduced in the secondary control. The secondary control is designed based on a consistent Kalman filtering algorithm, which is able to improve the accuracy by introducing corrections to the current predicted values from the previous moment of the neighbors. In addition, the consistency gain matrix is transformed into consistency coefficients to improve the correction speed. The filtered secondary control signal is fed into the primary control for voltage recovery and precise power distribution. A rigorous proof based on Lyapunov’s technique shows that the method guarantees the convergence of global voltage regulation under FDI attacks. Simulation results show that the proposed method can achieve voltage recovery and accurate power distribution when the DC microgrid is subjected to FDI attacks.