Persuasion-Bargaining and Institutions in an Organized Anarchy

Abstract

A key debate in the study of the American presidency concerns the determinants of presidential decisions. Traditionally, decisions were seen as the result of persuasion-bargaining. President-centered factors, such as the preferences of the man who occupies the office and the relationships between his senior advisors determined presidential decisions. Recently, the field has made a transition to institution-based models, in which each president and his advisers are rational actors responding to the political and legal forces that frame the office. This essay suggests a research agenda that incorporates both approaches. The Garbage Can model of decision is used to illustrate how the foreign policy process is an organized anarchy; decision making is the intersection of four streams–choice opportunities, problems, solutions, and participants. The model helps identify both institutional and persuasion-bargaining variables and highlights their interactions as streams are connected to produce policy. Clinton administration decisions on trade with China in 1993-1994 are the focus. Overall, a useful metaphor for decision making is to see it as a game. Institutional forces establish the rules, define most of the players in the game and their relative power within the game; how the rules are used, manipulated, interpreted, or compromised depends on the idiosyncratic beliefs and political skills of the players involved. In this case, differing perceptions of China held within different institutions competed through a legal and political framework, but the ultimate outcome depended on the decision making and deal making skills of the key officials, including the president.