Affiliation:
1. Krannert Graduate School of Management Purdue University
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to examine the impact of the availability of final-offer arbitration on the collective bargaining process and its outcomes. If this technique is to act as an effective strike substitute, it should provide bargainers with incentives to negotiate agreements bilaterally and should distribute bargaining power in much the same manner as would the right to strike. Empirical evidence is provided to evaluate the operation of final-offer arbitration in terms of these attributes. On the basis of this evidence, it would appear that policy-makers should consider final-offer arbitration as an alternative device for resolving conflicts.
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science,General Business, Management and Accounting
Reference21 articles.
1. Dworkin, J. (1976) "The impact of final-offer interest arbitration on bargaining: the case of major league baseball," pp. 161-169 in Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Winter Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association.
2. An Economic Model of a Professional Sports League
Cited by
20 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献