Abstract
Research examining the antecedents of recalls, instead of their consequences, is relatively sparse and has not considered whether firms’ likelihood to recall products is influenced by legal changes that could induce managerial opportunism, such as those reducing shareholder litigation risk. To examine this question, the authors exploit the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws across several U.S. states as a quasi-natural experiment. UD laws aim to prevent frivolous litigation from disrupting a firm's normal business operations by making it more difficult for shareholders to sue managers for neglecting their fiduciary duties and hold them personally liable. Although UD laws are well-intended, the reduced threat of shareholder litigation disciplining a firm's managers could have unintended negative consequences. Indeed, using a difference-in-differences analysis, the authors find that following the adoption of UD laws, affected firms become less likely to recall products. This effect is weaker in the presence of organizational mechanisms constraining managers’ self-interest-seeking behavior, such as a corporate culture focused on customer needs and interests or the exercise of normative control through monitoring by institutional investors. The authors do not find support for a potential alternative explanation of operational improvement and therefore higher product quality driving their findings.