On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games

Published:2015-10-27 Issue:04 Volume:17 Page:1550008
ISSN:0219-1989
Container-title:International Game Theory Review
language:en
Short-container-title:Int. Game Theory Rev.

Author:

Peleg Bezalel¹,Sudhölter Peter²

Affiliation:

1. Institute of Mathematics and The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Feldman Building, Givat Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel

2. Department of Business and Economics, and COHERE, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej, 55, 5230 Odense M, Denmark

Abstract

We show that the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex.

Publisher

World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Business and International Management,General Computer Science

Link

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S0219198915500085

Reference15 articles.

1. An Ordinal Bargaining Set for Games Without Side Payments

2. R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler, Advances in Game Theory, Annals of Mathematical Studies 52, eds. M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley and A. W. Tucker (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1964) pp. 443–476.

3. Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility

4. M. Davis and M. Maschler, Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, ed. M. Shubik (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1967) pp. 39–52.

5. Cores of Convex Games Without Side Payments

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