THE RIVER SHARING PROBLEM: A SURVEY-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

THE RIVER SHARING PROBLEM: A SURVEY

Published:2013-07-29 Issue:03 Volume:15 Page:1340016
ISSN:0219-1989
Container-title:International Game Theory Review
language:en
Short-container-title:Int. Game Theory Rev.

Author:

BEAL SYLVAIN¹,GHINTRAN AMANDINE²,REMILA ERIC³,SOLAL PHILIPPE⁴

Affiliation:

1. CRESE, University of Franche-Comté, 30 Avenue de l'Observatoire, 25009 Besançon, France

2. EQUIPPE, University of Lille 3, Domaine universitaire du Pont de Bois, BP 59653 Villeneuve d'Ascq Cedex, France

3. LIP, CNRS-ENS Lyon-University of Lyon 1, University of Lyon, 46 allée d'Italie, 69364 Lyon Cedex 07, France

4. GATE-CNRS, University of Saint-Etienne, 06 rue Basse des Rives, 42023 Saint-Etienne, France

Abstract

The river sharing problem deals with the fair distribution of welfare resulting from the optimal allocation of water among a set of riparian agents. Ambec and Sprumont [Sharing a river, J. Econ. Theor. 107, 453–462] address this problem by modeling it as a cooperative TU-game on the set of riparian agents. Solutions to that problem are reviewed in this article. These solutions are obtained via an axiomatic study on the class of river TU-games or via a market mechanism.

Publisher

World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Business and International Management,General Computer Science

Link

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S0219198913400161

Reference24 articles.

1. Sharing a river among satiable agents

2. Sharing a River

3. Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

4. Rooted-tree solutions for tree games

5. Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities

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