Affiliation:
1. Faculty of Computer Science, Electrical Engineering and Mathematics, University of Paderborn, D-33102 Paderborn, Germany
2. Department of Computer Science, University of Cyprus, Nicosia CY-1678, Cyprus
Abstract
In the model of restricted parallel links, n users must be routed on m parallel links under the restriction that the link for each user be chosen from a certain set of allowed links for the user. In a (pure) Nash equilibrium, no user may improve its own Individual Cost (latency) by unilaterally switching to another link from its set of allowed links. The Price of Anarchy is a widely adopted measure of the worst-case loss (relative to optimum) in system performance (maximum latency) incurred in a Nash equilibrium. In this work, we present a comprehensive collection of bounds on Price of Anarchy for the model of restricted parallel links and for the special case of pure Nash equilibria. Specifically, we prove: • For the case of identical users and identical links, the Price of Anarchy is [Formula: see text]. • For the case of identical users, the Price of Anarchy is [Formula: see text]. • For the case of identical links, the Price of Anarchy is [Formula: see text], which is asymptotically tight. • For the most general case of arbitrary users and related links, the Price of Anarchy is at least m – 1 and less than m. The shown bounds reveal the dependence of the Price of Anarchy on n and m for all possible assumptions on users and links.
Publisher
World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt
Subject
Hardware and Architecture,Theoretical Computer Science,Software
Cited by
28 articles.
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