Payoff-dependence learning ability resolves social dilemmas

Abstract

Understanding the appearance and maintenance of cooperation behavior is one of the most interesting challenges in natural and social sciences. Evolutionary game is a useful tool to study this issue. Here, we consider a basic strategy updating rule: the probability of a player updating its strategy is affected by the learning ability, which is determined by payoffs and an aspiration parameter [Formula: see text]. For positive [Formula: see text], learning ability is directly proportional to player’s own payoff. When [Formula: see text] equals 0, it returns to traditional situation. It is found that increasing the value of [Formula: see text] can promote the cooperation. With the increase of [Formula: see text], the player’s learning ability is continuously enhanced, and the probability of changing strategies is also increased. This paper verifies the influence of the introduced selection parameter [Formula: see text] on the cooperation rate from different aspects. We tested this hypothesis through the Monte Carlo simulation, and demonstrated that introducing [Formula: see text] changed the network of interaction effectively, therefore changing the effect of the adoption of the strategy on the uncertainty of cooperation evolution. This paper analyzed the results of the payoff-dependence learning ability of different players when they imitate the strategies of their opponents, which can effectively promote the evolution of cooperation.