The role of airborne particles in the epidemiology of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus in commercial poultry production units

Abstract

ABSTRACTSince October 2021, Europe has experienced the largest avian influenza virus (AIV) epizootic, caused by clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity AIV (HPAIV), with over 320 poultry and captive bird infected premises (IPs) and 2480 dead H5N1 positive wild birds detected in Great Britain alone. Many IPs have been detected as geographical clusters, raising questions around potential lateral spread between premises by airborne particles. Airborne transmission over short distances has been reported for some AIVs strains. However, the risk of airborne spread of this strain remains to be elucidated. We conducted extensive sampling from IPs where clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIVs was confirmed during the 2022/23 epizootic, each representing a major poultry species (ducks, turkeys, and chickens). A range of environmental samples were collected inside and outside houses, including deposited dust, feathers, and other potential fomites. Viral RNA (vRNA) and infectious virus were detected in air samples collected from inside and outside, but in close proximity, of infected houses, with vRNA alone being detected greater distances (>10m) outside. Some dust samples collected outside of the affected houses contained infectious virus, while feathers from the affected houses, located up to 60m away, only contained vRNA. Together, these data suggest that airborne particles harbouring infectious HPAIV can be translocated short distances (<10m) through the air, while particles containing vRNA might travel further (<50m). Therefore, the potential for airborne transmission of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV between premises is considered low. Other factors, including indirect contact with wild birds, fomite spread and the efficiency of biosecurity represent greater importance in disease incursion.IMPORTANCEUnderstanding the routes of avian influenza virus incursion into poultry premises is critical to ensure the implementation of effective preventative measures, reducing the risk of spread of the virus. Extensive environmental sampling across three infected premises, representing the major global commercial poultry species, detected viral RNA and infectious virus in air samples, dust, and other fomites inside of the houses containing infected poultry, as well as within the immediate proximity of infected houses. This suggests that particles harbouring infectious virus may travel short distances outside of affected houses, which may potentially contribute to house-to-house transmission on the same premises, but not at distances likely to contribute to the transmission to another poultry premises. Consequently, control efforts should be focused on traditional, robust biosecurity measures at key barriers on poultry houses. Human behaviour in and around poultry houses as factors contributing to biosecurity risks should be considered.