Affiliation:
1. Exeter College, University of Oxford King’s College London UK
Abstract
Abstract
In his 2022 article ‘A puzzle about the fixity of the past’, Lampert argues that standard views concerning knowledge and the semantics of ‘actually’ conflict with a widely held principle concerning the fixity of the past. I show that his attempt to establish the conflict fails, as it rests on the implicit assumption that a past mental state or utterance involving a modal indexical must have the same content across worlds with a shared past, when in fact it must, given its character, differ in content.
Funder
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
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