Why do Borrowers Default on Mortgages?

Author:

Ganong Peter1,Noel Pascal1

Affiliation:

1. University of Chicago , United States

Abstract

Abstract There are three prevailing theories of mortgage default: strategic default (driven by negative equity), cash flow default (driven by negative life events), and double-trigger default (where both negative triggers are necessary). It has been difficult to compare these theories in part because negative life events are measured with error. We address this measurement error using a comparison group of borrowers with no strategic-default motive. Our central finding is that only 6% of underwater defaults are caused exclusively by negative equity, an order of magnitude lower than previously thought. We then analyze the remaining defaults. We find that 70% are driven solely by negative life events (i.e., cash flow defaults), while 24% are driven by the interaction between negative life events and negative equity (i.e., double-trigger defaults). Together, the results provide a full decomposition of the theories underlying borrower default and suggest that negative life events play a central role.

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

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