Perceptual Normativity in Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

Abstract Despite Merleau-Ponty’s well-known reservations about some aspects of Husserlian phenomenology, this chapter shows that the analyses of perceptual experiences carried out in the Phenomenology of Perception accord with Husserl’s on a fundamental respect: like for Husserl, Merleau-Ponty conceives of perception, illusions, and hallucinations both in intentional and normative terms. After having shown the role of the norms of concordance (Section 2.1) and optimality (Section 2.2) in Merleau-Ponty’s account of perceptions, the chapter provides a detailed analysis of his phenomenological conception of illusion (Section 2.3) and hallucination (Section 2.4) in turn, exposing how Merleau-Ponty defines both types of experiences in terms of the specific ways they break with the norms of regular perceptual experiencing. Throughout, the chapter insists more on the commonalities than on the differences between Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of perceptual experience and demonstrates how both phenomenologists deal with the threat of scepticism (Section 2.5).