Abstract
Abstract
The fifth-century bce Greek philosopher Plato and the eighth-century ce Mādhyamika Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva face a similar tension regarding their claims that developing other-regarding virtue benefits its possessor. For Plato, justice requires the philosopher to forgo her desire to focus on theoretical study and take her turn at ruling the city. For Śāntideva, the bodhisattva’s compassion leads him to remain in the realm of rebirth to save sentient beings. This chapter shows how both authors respond to this tension by psychologizing virtues which are ordinarily conceived of as primarily governing external behavior. This results in inviolable happiness for the bodhisattva. In partial contrast, the happiness of Plato’s philosopher is constituted by her just soul, but remains imperfect, given the incompatibility of the aims of reason, which desires both to bring unity to the city and to continue its focus on theoretical study.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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