Plato’s Catuṣkoṭi and Nāgārjuna’s Parmenides

Abstract

Abstract In the dialectical exercise of Plato’s Parmenides, the intrinsically contradictory deductions drawn from the hypotheses about the One imply that the One is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither endowed with an essence nor deprived thereof. Does this symmetrical negation constitute a self-refutation of Plato’s metaphysics, or is it evidence that “the One” refers to the same thing as the sovereign “Good” of the Republic, which is also supposed to stand beyond essence? Rewriting the Parmenides with Nāgārjuna’s concepts could help to answer this question. It looks as if Plato used the various predicative combinations of the Mādhyamika tetralemma, especially the symmetrical negation, in order to remove our native oblivion concerning the axiological status of the One, just like Nāgārjuna used it to remove our hypostatizing habits concerning the phenomena of everyday life. Conversely, the soteriological purpose of Mādhyamika dialectic becomes clearer when contrasted with the Platonic project to reach an unconditioned principle.