Affiliation:
1. University of Michigan , Ann Arbor , USA
Abstract
Abstract
This paper defends a version of epistemic contextualism that accounts for the ordinary judgements and theoretical principles that motivate pragmatic encroachment. Adopting this contextualist view, we can avoid the counterintuitive consequences of pragmatic encroachment, while still preserving its attractive applications.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
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