Affiliation:
1. Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs , USA
2. Universidad Nacional de La Plata , Argentina
3. Columbia University , USA
Abstract
Abstract
This paper analyses frameworks for the design of the rules for international trading, assuming that it is possible to have some rule of law. In the Arrow–Debreu benchmark, where there is no economic power and political power is seemingly irrelevant, there is no need for trade agreements—free trade is the optimal policy for each country. But under even minimal deviations from that benchmark, trade agreements matter. We focus on environments in which there are market failures, technology is endogenous, and there is political power. Power dynamics play, for instance, a critical role in the design, implementation, and enforcement of agreements, with the latter being a critical difference between international agreements and domestic contracts and a key determinant of the feasibility and consequences of agreements. With endogenous technology, trade rules proscribing industrial policies may lead to lower growth and greater cross-country inequalities. Finally, we develop a normative framework which may be useful in the design and implementation of trade rules.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
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