Reason, Moral Virtue, and Moral Value

Abstract

Abstract In moral philosophy Aristotle is well known to stand for the primacy of character, judgement, and perceptiveness. For him, the virtues of character and the nuanced appreciation they bring of the multiplicity of legitimate claims there always are on one‘s attention are the central phenomena for ethics. For many, this is an appealing view. But Aristotle‘s theory of the virtues is constructed upon an elaborate and well-articulated basis in psychological theory. He approaches the question what the virtues are and what of value they contribute to a human life through the postulation and analysis of several psychological capacities that he argues human beings by their nature all possess. It is a person‘s use of these capacities that determines how their life goes, whether for better or for worse. In order properly to understand Aristotle’ theory of the virtues one must develop it explicitly from within the context of his psychological theory. I attempt to do this in what follows. As a result I am able to offer in conclusion some thoughts about what precisely that ‘nobility’ or ‘fineness’ or ‘beauty’ in action is that Aristotle makes the constant goal of morally virtuous action as such, and how its pursuit fits together with the other concerns that also motivate the morally virtuous agent.