The Anatomy of Primary Substance in Aristotle’s Categories

Abstract

Abstract This paper investigates two aspects of Aristotle’s conception of a primary substance in the Categories. The first part concerns a primary substance’s relation to its accidental attributes: on one interpretation, (A), a primary substance encompasses all its attributes, including accidental ones; on another, (B), it encompasses only its essential attributes, the accidental attributes being extrinsic to it, though related; on an intermediate interpretation, (C), it does not encompass all its attributes or only essential ones, but all necessary ones. After surveying the history of these interpretations, the chapter argues in favour of (B). In the second part, it argues that a particular human being, their soul, and their body all count as primary substances, where soul and body are parts of the substance. This hypothesis harmonizes with some views advanced in the Categories and passages from other Aristotelian works. The chapter concludes by comparing this view with Aristotle’s mature hylomorphic doctrine.