This chapter defends a mechanistic and teleosemantic view of naturalized intentionality that underlies the role of error detection via coherence checking. Representational mechanisms serve the biological functions of representing, which are related to the semantic value of representation: its truth or falsity, its being vacuous or satisfied, or its accuracy. If representational mechanisms contain (or interact with) error-detection mechanisms, the semantic value of representation is causally relevant. As long as semantic value is causally relevant in cognitive explanations, the content of representation is arguably causally relevant, which vindicates the notion of mental representation in contemporary scientific research. Error detection is understood mechanistically in terms of coherence checking, which is purely computational and does not presuppose any semantic function. This chapter analyzes this conceptually and demonstrates that this account is descriptively adequate by citing a recent experiment on zebra finches, even though discrepancy detection is not always related to intentionality.