Asymmetry, Territorial Control, and Rebel Tactics

Abstract

Abstract It follows from the conception of terrorism as underground violence that terrorism is most likely in contexts marked by high asymmetry between the parties. Terrorist violence is expected when the perpetrators of the violence are significantly weaker than the enemy. Asymmetry in power is what forces armed groups to go underground (in the actor-sense) and to use the indirect tactics associated with terrorism (in the action-sense). Thus, in the actor-sense, the greater the asymmetry between the parties, the more likely it is that the weaker one is underground. This leads into an important conjecture that is nicely confirmed by the data: underground groups are more likely in countries with middle levels of development. In the action sense, a strong correlation is found between lower capabilities (captured by absence of territorial control) and the choice of indirect tactics: when perpetrators do not control territory, they carry out more bombings and assassinations.