Abstract
Abstract
This chapter focuses on the cognitive commitments involved in the focal faith practices of the book, such as thanking or praising God. The chapter argues that these commitments can be supplied by either beliefs or nondoxastic assumptions, but that ten other candidates (e.g., hope, credence) fail. It then considers the concern that taking on these beliefs or assumptions would be epistemically unjustified for individuals with ambiguous evidence for God. In response, it is argued that these commitments either are not epistemically unjustified or are epistemically excused, or their epistemic disvalue is outweighed by their moral value. To defend this response, the chapter engages with work in mainstream epistemology and articulates a novel argument for why the epistemic norms governing assumptions differ from those governing beliefs.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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