Aristotle: Processes and Continuants

Abstract

Abstract This chapter discusses David Charles’ view that an Aristotelian kinēsis (or process) is, in certain important respects, like a continuant. It focuses on two claims Charles makes about Aristotelian kinēsis: that a kinēsis has ‘modal depth’ (i.e., a particular kinēsis could have developed differently from how it did in fact develop) and that a kinēsis can itself be the proper subject of change. The second of these claims seems inconsistent with Aristotle’s own remarks in Physics 5.2 and Categories 5. The chapter argues that it is possible to distinguish two different accounts of kinēsis in Aristotle’s work. On one account, defended in Physics 5–6, a kinēsis is explanatorily posterior to its temporal parts. On this account, a kinēsis lacks modal depth and cannot be the proper subject of change (hence, Aristotle’s claims in Physics 5.2). On the other account, implied by Aristotle’s remarks in Physics 8, a kinēsis is explanatorily prior to its temporal parts. The chapter argues that such an account allows for the possibility that a kinēsis could have modal depth and even that a kinēsis could be the subject of change. This second account suggests the interesting possibility that a kinēsis might be a kind of entity that differs from an enduring substance in having temporal parts, but is like an enduring substance in having modal depth and in being itself a possible subject of change.