Abstract
Abstract
This chapter compares and contrasts the possibilities and limitations of religious fictionalism (RF) with those of moral fictionalism (MF). It argues that “thoroughgoing” versions of fictionalism are problematic but “lightweight” versions are defensible, especially for the religious domain. While there are pressures on both MF and RF to remain thoroughgoing, RF can better negotiate these. The chapter also considers the objection that RF lacks a good answer to the question of why one should adopt a (particular) religious fiction. A comparison with MF points the way towards the right response. Finally, the chapter reflects on a peculiar difficulty faced by RF that is structurally similar to the difficulty thoroughgoing fictionalists have when attempting to demarcate acceptance from belief; the similarity highlights an additional reason to recognize RF as a sui generis stance on religion.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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