Abstract
AbstractThis chapter compares the elemental regimes of the international shadow banking complex. It then discusses the preferences of the main actors that engage in the game of shadows concerning the definition, measurement, and regulation of shadow banking, explaining how their pathways of influence are affected by regime complexity. Finally, this chapter spells out the perils of regime complexity and puts forward policy recommendations. It is argued that regime complexity generates a multi-dimensional chessboard in which various actors play, compounding problems, while splintering solutions. Jurisdictions pursue different preferences and compete with each other; sectoral regulators disagree on consequential matters involving bureaucratic competences and epistemic outlooks; and the financial industry engages in venue-shopping and coalition-building. The resolution of these conflicts is made more difficult by the fragmentation of regulatory authority: no actor is in the driving seat, several of them work at cross purposes, whereas a focal coordinating institution is missing.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Reference503 articles.
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