Abstract
Abstract
The argument from minimal criteria holds that the reason-responsive consequentialist view is our best hope for meeting three minimal criteria on an account of boundedly rational inquiry: sensitivity to tradeoffs made during inquiry; sensitivity to the stakes of inquiry; and explaining the rational impermissibility of many inferences made by stereotyping. I review three existing accounts of boundedly rational inquiry: the Standard Picture, pragmatism, and an account on which inquiry aims at knowledge. I argue that these accounts struggle to satisfy the minimal criteria, while by contrast the reason-responsive consequentialist view performs well by the lights of all three criteria.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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