Abstract
Abstract
This chapter takes up the remaining four normative claims about bounded rationality made in Chapter 2. I show how the reason-responsive consequentialist view makes space for the claim that bounds matter by telling a principled story about how and why bounds matter to rational cognition. I use the global consequentialist commitments of the view to interpret and defend the claim that rationality should be process-focused. I show how the reason-responsive consequentialist view grounds the rationality of paradigmatic cognitive heuristics and sheds light on the factors guiding rational choice among heuristic strategies. And I use the reason-responsive consequentialist view to defend an interpretation of ecological rationality.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Reference478 articles.
1. Approximating MAPs for belief networks is NP-hard and other theorems.;Artificial Intelligence,1998
2. On rational betting systems.;Archiv für mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung,1962
3. Motive utilitarianism.;Journal of Philosophy,1976
4. Alston, William. 1978. “Meta-ethics and meta-epistemology.” In Alvin Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (eds), Values and morals, 275–97. D. Reidel.