Beyond Basic Responsibility

Abstract

Abstract The primary aim of this chapter is to better understand how responsible action is connected to our evaluative stances as agents. According to the theory of basic responsibility, agents are guided by their representations such that, when responsible, their actions reveal the things that matter to them. Unlike traditional views, however, the theory understands these cares as being partially constituted by those responsible doings. It is through an agent’s activities that their preferences, priorities, and cares are composed. With this general approach in hand, the chapter argues that similar treatments can be given for assessment of character and attitudes. Character assessments can be understood as more general, cumulative assessments built out of responsible doings. The cruel person is just one who is responsible for many cruel things. Similarly, the chapter argues that agents are not separably responsible for their attitudes. Instead, the sexist is blameworthy due to their sexist activities (which can include mental activities like considering, attending to, endorsing, and so on). The chapter also criticizes a common distinction in the literature between two purported kinds of responsibility (attributability and accountability), reiterating the theory’s commitment to providing a unified view of responsibility.