Author:
Aldrich Howard E,Zimmer Catherine R,Staber Udo H,Beggs Ohn J
Abstract
Abstract
American trade associations, as minimalist organizations, have grown into a mature population in an environment characterized by intrapopulation norms supporting mutualistic behavior, lack of significant interpopulation competition, and an institutional environment that was usually strongly supportive of capitalist structures. Research on two other evolving populations in the United States-state bar associations and national trade unions-illustrates two alternative fates that trade associations might have experienced. State bar associations, after decades of experimentation with alternatives, finally settled on an organizational form that gave them monopoly control over the admission of lawyers to the bar in all 50 states. The bar associations’ stunning achievement was solidified because they successfully mobilized to win state support. Trade unions, by contrast, struggled to achieve legitimacy against a hostile business community and a state that was antagonistic or indifferent until the 1930s. Even after achieving national legal standing, trade unions (like trade associations) stood outside the formal structure of the state and (unlike trade associations) have gradually seen their gains eroded over the past three decades. We bring together our research on the foundings, mergers, and transformations, and disbandings of American trade associations to tell the story of a population that escaped, at lease up to now, the unhappy fate of its companion population-trade unions-but that has never achieved the iron-clad legitimacy of another population with similar collective goals-state bar associations. As mimimalist organizations, these populations differ in some important respects from private, profit-oriented businesses that are the subject of most evolutionary analyses. As organizations with a political agenda, they also differ from many of the non-profit-oriented organizations that evolutionary researchers have studied.
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York, NY
Cited by
2 articles.
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1. The case for associational self-regulation of lobbying in the United States;Interest Groups & Advocacy;2024-06-04
2. Professional and Business Associations;Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance;2022