Affiliation:
1. University of Lyon
2. School of Economics, University of Nottingham
3. School of Economics and CBESS, University of East Anglia
Abstract
Abstract
We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earning outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoids an equal and Pareto efficient outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.
Funder
Economic and Social Research Council
British Academy
LABEX
Université de Lyon
French National Research Agency
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Cited by
20 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献