Affiliation:
1. Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
Abstract
Abstract
While many authors distinguish belief from acceptance, it seems almost universally agreed that no similar distinction can be drawn between degrees of belief, or credences, and degrees of acceptance. I challenge this assumption in this paper. Acceptance comes in degrees and acknowledging this helps to resolve problems in at least two philosophical domains. Degrees of acceptance play vital roles when we simplify our reasoning, and they ground the common ground of a conversation if we assume context probabilism, i.e., that the common ground must be represented with probability spaces rather than possible worlds.
Funder
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Cited by
2 articles.
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1. On proper presupposition;Philosophy and Phenomenological Research;2023-04-13
2. Assertion and Certainty;The Philosophical Quarterly;2023-03-17