Affiliation:
1. Chongqing Normal University
Abstract
Climate-Change (Global warming) is the central point on the current agenda of the international environmental policy. This paper proposes a model to formulate the global warming policy as dynamic Stackelberg or Leader-Follower Game. In this game, an international agency or international agreement is the leader, who will decide the emission abatement rate of each region; and the followers are several regions who control their consumption of carbon-energy relating to carbon emissions. The challenge of this model is to solve its equilibrium since it is not a liner-quadratic game model.
Publisher
Trans Tech Publications, Ltd.
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