Abstract
Where E is the proposition that [If H and O were true, H would explain O], William Roche and Elliot Sober have argued that P(H | O&E) = P(H | O). In this article I argue that not only is this equality not generally true, it is false in the very kinds of cases that Roche and Sober focus on, involving frequency data. In fact, in such cases O raises the probability of H only given that there is an explanatory connection between them.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy,History
Reference11 articles.
1. Why Explanatoriness Is Evidentially Relevant;McCain;Thought,2014
2. Inference to the Best Explanation, Dutch Books, and Inaccuracy Minimisation
3. Climenhaga, Nevin . 2017. “The Structure of Epistemic Probabilities.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Notre Dame.
4. Making Time Stand Still: A Response to Sober's Counter‐Example to the Principle of the Common Cause
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