Abstract
Several feminist philosophers of science have tried to open up the possibility that feminist ethical or political commitments could play a positive role in good science by appealing to the Duhem-Quine thesis and underdetermination of theories by observation. I examine several different interpretations of the claim that feminist values could play a legitimate role in theory justification and show that none of them follow from a logical gap between theory and observation. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach for defending the possibility that feminist political commitments could play a legitimate role in science.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy,History
Reference21 articles.
1. Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense;Anderson;Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense,1995a
2. Science as Social Knowledge
3. The Fate of Knowledge
Cited by
40 articles.
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