Abstract
Clifton and his colleagues have proposed a dimension-based conception of “primal world beliefs” – beliefs about “the overall character of the world.” Citing the potential importance of “primal world beliefs,” Lansford et al. (this volume) have called for research on their development. In this paper, I suggest that the concepts of “primal,” “world,” and “belief” rely on unarticulated everyday concepts that are psychologically undertheorized. The model of “primal world belief” is a kind of methodological artifact; that is, it arises as a dual product of everyday trait-like thinking and factor analytic methodology. Thus, while the authors are hopeful that “primal world beliefs” may provide an alternative way to explain the sources of stability that are typically attributed to “personality traits,” Clifton and his colleagues have themselves produced a kind of “trait theory of beliefs” – one that is vulnerable to many of the same critiques directed toward trait models of personality. After a critical analysis of the theoretical framework that undergirds the concept of “primal world beliefs,” I offer a relational-developmental approach to the empirical study of how children develop beliefs within and about our intersubjectively structured lifeworlds.