1. The question of “ripeness” as a condition for conflict resolution is dis-cussed in I. William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (eds.), International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War (Washington: National Academy Press, 2000), pp. 225–250.
2. For various definitions and treatments of the concept of conflict manage-ment, see Gary Goertz and Patrick M. Regan, “Conflict Management in Enduring Rivalries,” International Interactions, vol. 22 (1997), pp. 321–340.
3. On conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy, see Michael S. Lund, “Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampton, and Pamela Aall (eds.), Managing Global Chaos (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 3–24; Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy (New York: Carnegie, 1998).
4. For an extensive discussion of conflict-management strategies, see Alexander L. George, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries,” in Barry R. Schneider and Jerrold M. Post (eds.), Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and their Strategic Cultures (Alabama: United States Air Force, Counterproliferation Center, 2002), pp. 271–310. On regional conflict management, see Paul F. Diehl, “Regional Conflict Management: Strategies, Necessary Conditions, and Comparative Effectiveness,” in Paul F. Diehl and Joseph Lepgold (eds.), Regional Conflict Management (Boulder: Roman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 41–77.
5. George, “The Need for Influence Theory,” in Barry R. Schneider and Jerrold M. Post (eds.), Know Thy Enemy; see also Shaul Shai, “The Limited Confrontation and the Concept of Deterrence,” in Haggai Golan and Shaul Shai (eds.), The Limited Confrontation (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 2004) (Hebrew), pp. 165–188.