1. These are: the preservation of national sovereignty; the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs; pursuit of prosperity through markets; economic interdependence to enhance security; peaceful resolution of disputes; and adherence to global multilateralism. See Stuart Harris, “Asian Multilateral Institutions and Their Response to the Asian Economic Crisis,” Pacific Review 13.3 (2000), p. 502.
2. The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization was established at the Manila Conference of 1954 largely on the model of NATO, but failed because members found internal subversion rather than compelling external threats to be their primary security concerns. The Australia-New Zealand-U.S. Pact formed in 1951 as an extension of the U.S.-Australia treaty (the U.S.-New Zealand axis dissolved in 1986). The Five Power Defense Arrangement was established in 1971 among Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Its function was consultative based on historical legacies of the Commonwealth rather than any overt security purpose; see Leszek Buszynski, SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983); Chin Kin Wah, “The Five Power Defence Arrangement: Twenty Years After,” Pacific Review 4.3 (1991); and
3. Michael Yahuda, International Politics in the Asia-Pacific (London: Routledge, 1996).
4. For example, the Vietnam War Allies Conference met regularly in Saigon in the late 1960s and early 1970s providing a ready venue for multilateral security discussions on larger Cold War issues and strategy beyond Indochina, but nothing came of this. The Asia and Pacific Council (ASPAC) was established in 1966 as a forum for cooperation among Asian states on cultural and economic issues. Members included Australia, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam, and Japan. Proposals in the early 1970s were floated by various countries (e.g., South Korea in 1970) to devise a new ASPAC charter based on collective self-defense with region-wide membership (including Laos, Indonesia, and Singapore), but these failed in part because of lack of support for a active Japanese leadership role in the group. For other studies of Northeast Asian regionalism focusing more on economics and the Russian Far East, see Gilbert Rozman, “Flawed Regionalism: Reconceptualizing Northeast Asia in the 1990s,” The Pacific Review 11.1 (1998), pp. 1–27.
5. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), chapter 6.