The Utilization of Quantitative and Qualitative Information in Groups' Capital Investment Decisions

Abstract

ABSTRACT Organizations frequently use interactive groups to make strategic decisions, aiming to capitalize on individual members' unique knowledge. However, research shows that groups focus on information that members have in common, not unique information, resulting in suboptimal outcomes. Given that accounting systems can present information in various forms, we experimentally examine whether quantitative information results in greater information sharing and use than qualitative information. We take advantage of a rich dataset created by videoing groups making a capital investment decision. Consistent with prior research, we find that groups prefer common to unique information, regardless of whether it is quantitative or qualitative. However, individuals use quantitative information more than qualitative information before group interaction, and make more references to it during discussion. Added insights from the videos include identifying what determines greater use of quantitative cues, the importance of the numbers attached to cues, and how successful groups use quantitative cues. Data Availability: Please contact the authors.