Talking with al Qaeda: Is There a Role for Track Two?

Abstract

Despite saying that they will never “talk to terrorists,” many countries have done so. Often these dialogues have included a component of so-called “Track Two Diplomacy.” This article examines whether such a dialogue could be held withal Qaedaand other such groups. Research demonstrates that dialogues have been useful in ending terror campaigns in certain circumstances, but that they were never the decisive element. Where they have been useful, dialogues have helped to distinguish those members of terror organizations who are willing to talk from the hardliners, in helping to develop ‘acceptable’ players on the other side, and in allowing the two sides to better understand each other. The article finds that a dialogue with the hard core ofal Qaedais likely impossible, but that some elements may be willing to talk. Such dialogues will be localized and will be about specific concerns and, like in other cases, will be about seeing if there are elements of the movement that can be detached from the hard-core base. Track Two may have a role to play in these dialogues, but expectations should be kept modest.