Abstract
In this paper I consider whether it's possible to cause an event I argue: (i) that sometimes an agent who lets an event happen causes it; (ii) that whether an agent caused an event that he lets happen depends partly on whether he had an obligation to do what might have prevented that event, as well as on considerations about the agent's control over what they omit to do; and (iii) that the use of the word "cause" here is genuinely causal. I suggest that resistance to accept these claims depends often on an excessively narrow view of the concept of causation.
Cited by
3 articles.
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1. VI-Agency and Two-Way Powers;Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback);2013-04
2. Actions, thought-experiments and the ‘Principle of alternate possibilities’;Australasian Journal of Philosophy;2009-01-08
3. The four faces of omission;Philosophical Explorations;2006-09