Optimization of supervision mechanism for public cooperation considering limited supervision ability and heterogeneous preferences

Author:

Guo Peng1,Wang Xiaonan1,Zhang Duo2

Affiliation:

1. School of Management, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China

2. School of Management, Shenyang Jianzhu University, Shenyang, Liaoning, China

Abstract

Punishment promotes cooperation among selfish agents. Unlike previous studies, we propose a new supervision (heterogeneous preference supervision, HPS) mechanism based on the original random supervision (ORS) mechanism considering regulators’ limited supervision ability and agents’ heterogeneous preferences. The concepts of exemption list capacity, observation period, and removal time are introduced as the variables under the HPS mechanism. A public goods game model is built to verify the supervision effects under the ORS and HPS mechanisms. The simulation results show that the HPS mechanism can promote cooperation more than the ORS mechanism. Increasing the exemption list capacity can make regulators pay more attention to defectors and improve the cooperation level. Setting a relatively moderate observation period benefits a better supervision effect, while a too-small or too-large observation period leads to the collapse of cooperation. Shortening the removal time can increase the updating speed of the exemption list and enhance the role of the exemption list, resulting in improving the fraction of cooperators.

Publisher

IOS Press

Subject

Artificial Intelligence,General Engineering,Statistics and Probability

Reference47 articles.

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