Conspiracy theories and passion

Abstract

Abstract Conspiracy theories are not merely propositions about states of affairs, they are also speech acts and because of that their meaning consists not only in what conspiracy theorists say but also in what they do with words or, in other words, in the pragmatics of their stories. Building on a concept developed by Stanley Cavell, the article argues that from the point of view of pragmatics conspiracy theories are a form of passionate speech. In contrast with illocutionary acts, the point of passionate speech consists in making the other respond here, now and in kind (thus implicitly recognizing that the subject of the act has rightfully addressed her or him in this way). The conceptualization of conspiracy theories as passionate speech is intended to demonstrate that debunking can be counterproductive if it ignores the pragmatic dimension of conspiracy theories, and in effect the attempts to counteract disinformation can easily deteriorate into a dialogue of the deaf.