Abstract
AbstractThe tragedy of the commons occurs when competition among individual members of a group leads to overexploitation of a shared resource to the detriment of the overall population. We hypothesize that cancer cells may engage in a tragedy of the commons when competing for a shared resource such as glucose. To formalize this notion, we create a game theoretic model of glucose uptake based on a cell’s investment in transporters relative to that of its neighboring cells. We show that production of transporters per cell increases as the number of competing cells in a microenvironment increases and nutrient uptake per cell decreases. Furthermore, the greater the resource availability, the more intense the tragedy of the commons at the ESS. Based on our simulations, cancer cells produce 2.2–2.7 times more glucose transporters than would produce optimal fitness for all group members. A tragedy of the commons affords novel therapeutic strategies. By simulating GLUT1 inhibitor and glucose deprivation treatments, we demonstrate a synergistic combination with standard-of-care therapies, while also displaying the existence of a trade-off between competition among cancer cells and depression of their gain function. Assuming cancer cell transporter production is heritable, we then show the potential for a sucker’s gambit therapy by exploiting this trade-off. By strategically changing environmental conditions, we can take advantage of cellular competition and gain function depression.
Funder
National Science Foundation
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | NIH | National Cancer Institute
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Applied Mathematics,Computer Science Applications,Drug Discovery,General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology,Modeling and Simulation
Cited by
12 articles.
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