Distributed power analysis attack on SM4 encryption chip
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Published:2024-01-10
Issue:1
Volume:14
Page:
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ISSN:2045-2322
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Container-title:Scientific Reports
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language:en
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Short-container-title:Sci Rep
Author:
Gong Haoran,Ju Tailiang
Abstract
AbstractEncryption chips are specialized integrated circuits that incorporate encryption algorithms for data encryption and decryption, ensuring data confidentiality and security. In China, the domestic SM4 algorithm is commonly utilized, as opposed to the international AES encryption algorithm. These widely implemented encryption standards have been proven to be difficult to crack through crypt analysis methods Currently, power consumption side-channel attacks are the most prevalent method. They involve capturing power consumption data during the encryption process and subsequently recovering the encryption key from this data. The two leading methods are Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and machine learning techniques. DPA does not necessitate prior knowledge but relies heavily on the number of power consumption curves. With only 50 power consumption data points, the accuracy is a mere 80%. Machine learning methods require prior knowledge, achieving an accuracy rate above 95% with only 30 power traces, albeit with training times typically exceeding 15 min. In this paper, a distributed energy analysis attack approach was presented based on Correlation Power Analysis (CPA). The power consumption data was divided into 16 subsets, with each subset corresponding to 8 bytes of the key. By training each subset separately, the 8-byte key’s corresponding power consumption data is reduced to only 100 dimensions, resulting in a 76% decrease in cracking time and a 3% improvement in cracking accuracy rate.This article also trains a more complex 256 classification model to directly crack the final key, achieving a success rate of 28% in cracking 128-bit passwords with only 1 power trace
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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