A munkahelyi egészségsérelmek kompenzációjának felelősségbiztosítási modellje Magyarországon és az Európai Unióban

Abstract

"One of the most important issues in the design of national work injury compensation systems is how the two main possible routes of liability relate: on the one hand, the non-tort compensation (social security) model and, on the other, the tort compensation (employers’ liability under civil or labour law) model. In the Hungarian system of accident compensation in labour law, the employee is primarily entitled to certain benefits within the framework of social insurance and may claim damages in excess of this in damages lawsuits. Employers’ liability schemes can be supplemented by voluntary liability insurance solutions. Liability insurance contracts protect both parties: employers are protected against unplanned payments, possibly large amounts of compensation, and the outcome of potentially unpredictable compensation lawsuits, while it means guaranteed coverage for the employee in case of damage. The introduction of compulsory liability insurance for employers is an issue that arises from time to time. In some countries, employers are required to take out liability insurance, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Austria. In insurance-based models, the route of compensation plays a marginal role. In Hungary, the penetration of liability insurance is low; however, there is currently no legislative intention to make liability insurance more extensive or mandatory for employers. In general, however, there is no universal model for accident compensation in labour law. There is no such benchmark at the European Union level either, and it can be said that there is no explicit intention to fully harmonize Member State regulations. In this study, I examine the consequences of the mandatory or wider application of liability insurance, the regulatory concepts that exist, and the role that the European Union plays in regulating the issue."