Affiliation:
1. University of California, Davis
Abstract
This two-part article is propaedeutic to considering subsequently Weiskrantz's “commentary” conception of consciousness: from the perspective that James bequeathed to us more than a century ago. Weiskrantz has sought to render plausible a general account of awareness that resembles the “Intellectualist” notion of mind to which James had objected in The Principles. Whereas the central problem he addresses is where in the brain James's consciousness stream flows, Weiskrantz holds all awareness, even pain, is commentary. Contrary to how it may appear to the person himself or herself, every state of consciousness is no more than a kind of behavioral response—covert, overt, or incipient—bringing something or other under some heading. Although Weiskrantz formulates his concept of awareness in terms of operations that get a subject to report so the experimenter can judge whether the subject is aware of something in particular, Weiskrantz rejects all strategies that seek to theoretically eliminate awareness. Nevertheless, he proposes awareness to consist simply of the actual or potential delivery of a report.
Cited by
2 articles.
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