Abstract
In this paper, the concept of weak active equilibrium, which was introduced in the eighties of the twentieth century by Smol’yakov, is used for the first time for a study of Bertrand– Edgeworth oligopoly (that is, competition among firms when firms’ strategies are prices and firms’ production capacities are limited). All symmetric weak active equilibria are found for the basic model of Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly, which was analysed in the sixties of the twentieth century by Beckmann. However, this model is highly simplified. Also, the question of existence of nonsymmetric weak active equilibria is studied.
Publisher
The Russian Academy of Sciences
Reference18 articles.
1. 1. Beckmann, M.J. (with the assistance of D. Hochst¨adter), Edgeworth-Bertrand Duopoly Revisited, Oper. Res. - Verfahren III (R. Henn, Ed.) Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hein, 1965, pp. 55-68.
2. 2. Cheviakov, A.F. and Hartwick, J.M., Beckmann's Edgeworth-Bertrand Duopoly Example Revisited, Int. Game Theory Rev., 2005, vol. 7, pp. 461-472.
3. 3. Levitan, R.E. and Shubik, M., Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints, Int. Econom. Rev., 1972, vol. 13, pp. 111-122.
4. 4. Kreps, D.M. and Scheinkman, J.A., Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes, Bell J. Econom., 1983, vol. 14, pp. 326-337.
5. 5. Davidson, C. and Deneckere, R. Long-run Competition in Capacity, Short-run Competition in Price, and the Cournot Model, Rand J. Econom., 1986, vol. 17, pp. 404-415.